Indicators of economic freedom and economic structure as determinants of growth and convergence in enlarging EU and priorities for Estonia by Rajasalu, Teet
Indicators of Economic Freedom and Economic
Structure as Determinants of Growth and
Convergence in Enlarging EU and Priorities for
Estonia
Teet Rajasalu
Estonian Institute of Economics at Tallinn Technical University
Abstract
Estonia and many other candidate countries will join the European
Union with remarkably lower income levels. It is believed (e.g.
European Commission, 2001) that they will face a rather long-lasting
catching-up process. This catch-up phase is expected to be driven by
convergence (Rajasalu, 2001). The paper studies some general
indicators of institutional development as determinants of conditional
beta-convergence in the European Union and candidate countries
including some indicators of education and health, political rights and
civil liberties. Indicators of economic freedom are studied more
thoroughly. Estonia’s prospects for catching-up and convergence with
the European economies are assessed using most relevant institutional
development and structural indicators. In order to better approximate
growth rates, panel estimates of economic freedom indicators are
complemented with structural indicators of economy.
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1. Introduction
Estonia’s GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) is much
lower than in the European Union member states.  The fact makes
catching up and real convergence with the EU income levels one of
the most urgent tasks of Estonia’s economic policy. According to the
European Commission (2001, p. 19) estimations it will take 19 years
before Estonia may reach 75% of the EU-15 GDP per capita level at
purchasing power standards (PPS).
Building of efficient and credible institutions is thought to be one
of the factors that can accelerate catching up and pave the way to real
beta-convergence. Institutional development in candidate countries
also increases coherence in integrating Europe and reduces
idiosyncrasies in responses to European monetary and fiscal policies.
The current study tries to estimate contribution of some
aggregate institutions to economic growth using the traditional
conditional beta-convergence approach. Various indicators that proxy
for institutional development are fitted into conditional convergence
equations to find out which of them are topical in the EU enlargement
context. We also assess Estonia’s prospects considering with reference
to institutional development indicators that prove the best
determinants of real convergence.
Since there are many methodological differences in national
statistical data we used information provided by international
organisations. This assumes that necessary amendments to make
national data comparable have already been made in these data. We
also concentrate on 15 European Union and 13 candidate countries to
find out institutional determinants within this sample. Thus we neglect
possible impacts of institutional developments that may be topical
outside Europe or that cease to be of great importance after reaching
some critical threshold level already achieved by the candidate
countries.
32. Institutional Development in the EU Convergence
Context
In this section I discuss different views expressed about convergence
of per capita incomes. Actual GDP per capita developments do not
always confirm the presence of overall absolute beta-convergence.
Additional difficulties are faced when assessing convergence of the
transition economies and European Union candidate countries.
It is rather broadly assumed that one reason why simple absolute
beta-convergence tends to fail relates to the development of
institutions and their role in economic advancement. The implications
of institutions on the economic growth are often overlooked as well.
North (1990, 1994) defined institutions as humanly designed formal
and informal rules of the game. He showed how institutional
development contributes to formation of effective markets. New
Institutional Economists (NIE) criticised neo-classical economists for
not paying enough attention to infrastructure and proper foundation of
economics. Institutional development is a learning process in which
shared individual beliefs form collective attitudes and turn into a kind
of culture (in a very broad sense). In order to structure these collective
attitudes and their interactions, human beings develop institutions. The
economic implications of collective values and behavioural norms as
well as public institutions have been studied by many authors. For
instance, Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999, 2002)
demonstrated direct impact of governance on incomes. Maximum
productivity is related to an efficient co-operative system of industrial
relations by Leibenstein’s (1966, 1978, 1987) and Altman’s (1996,
2001) x-efficiency theory.
Discussing the growth regression compilation, Durlauf and Quah
(1998) relied on approximately 100 indicators used by researchers in
growth equations. Many of these indicators also may be interpreted as
proxies of indicators of institutional development - health, income
inequality, politics (including civil liberties, political rights,
instability), price distortions, religion, rule of law, trade and trade
policy (openness, import penetration, outward orientation), etc.
However, it is not easy to select most appropriate determinants of
economic growth from this list. The large number of possible
regressors and their inclusion into estimations by groupings makes it
difficult to identify the robust or most significant ones and encourages
the researcher to implement complicated approaches (Doppelhoffer,
Miller, Sala-i-Martin, 2000). It should be also considered that many
country-specific data specialities complicate simple cross-section
4estimations so that adjustments are made for the data to be included in
international data bases (De la Fuente, Donénech, 2000).
In addition to studies that relate economic growth to initial level
of income there are also studies that include institutional development
indicators in traditional production functions. Human capital that is
often included in production functions (for instance, De la Fuente,
Donénech, 2000) can be treated as an indicator of institutional
development as well. A similar approach to human capital is often
used in modelling implications of the ‘New Economy’ (Pohjola,
2002). In a broad sense, human capital may consider implications of
education and culture, better legislation, quality of governance, well
structured and efficiently performing procedures for interaction
between businesses, state and individuals, etc.
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) showed that institutions
are very important from global aspect. However, it should not be
forgotten that, especially in global context many other factors affect
economy through institutions (Easterly and Levine, 2002) and often
institutions smooth impacts of adverse shocks. The broader the
geographical scope of the study and the greater the differences
between the countries included in the study, the more growth seems to
depend on institutions.
Although the world-wide impact of institutions on long-term
economic development seems to be confirmed by mainstream
economists it is still not obvious whether these findings are valid for
candidate countries’ relatively short-term and rapid institutional and
economic development. Therefore, it is worth checking whether the
afore-mentioned expectations of conditional convergence and
contribution of institutional changes on economic development hold
within a smaller and more homogenous sample of states that includes
EU member states and candidate countries during a time-span of about
ten years. As many candidate countries are supposed to join EU soon,
the processes in the European Union specific framework are of our
primary interest. At the same time, European Union has been one of
the ‘convergence clubs’ where real convergence has taken place
although the process has been uneven in recent years (Rajasalu, 2001).
Nevertheless, convergence in the EU offers some hopes for catching-
up to new member states with much lower income levels.
If empirical data confirm real convergence within this period
then we will try to assess Estonia’s performance within the process
and compare actual developments with convergence potential derived
from the EU and candidate countries empirics.
5Targeting of our research at institutional development in the EU
and candidate countries requires that some specific aspects be
considered. Institutional changes tend to be rather slow in general
(changes in governance may be one rare exception, perhaps). It takes
quite a long time before implications caused by rather slow changes in
education, culture, social networks, health, etc can be detected in real
economy. Therefore, long time series must be used to achieve relevant
results.
However, in the case of transition economies and EU candidate
countries the need for long time series makes such research rather
complicated. The transition processes of EU candidate countries have
lasted about 10 years only; the harmonisation process with the EU
economies after applying for the EU membership is even shorter. The
time series available are not long enough and, even if available; these
may include information that is irrelevant in the EU accession context.
The developments before the 1990s were too fuzzy to draw clear-cut
conclusions; information from this period often needs critical revision
and processes of this period can hardly be extrapolated on in the after-
accession period.
Even within this time, starting from the 1990s, distinction
between two sub-periods can be made. The content of the first sub-
period was the shift from planned to market economy in many CEE
countries. Problems of privatisation, economic liberalisation,
reduction of government intervention or participation in economic
activities were of major importance in the first half of the 1990s. This
was also a period of radical institutional reforms. However, in this
period transition countries tolerated serious recessions related to
transition shocks. The second sub-period (second half of the 1990s)
was characterised by harmonisation with the acquis communautaire;
building up of institutions based on shared values and approved
behavioural norms. The data on economic growth in this second sub-
period should reveal also the results of the reforms carried out during
the first sub-period. Thus, we will draw conclusions on a broad set of
issues based on growth data within a rather short time period.
Moreover, even this period was affected by external shocks caused by
Asian crisis in 1997 and Russian default in 1998.
63. Impact of Education, Health, Political and Civil Rights
and Economic Freedom on Economic Growth in EU
and Candidate Countries
To quantify implications of institutional development as well as
changes in political rights and economic freedom we run 4 series of
statistical estimations. First, we look the impact of education and
quality of life on the level human development and economic growth
worldwide and in the European Union and candidate countries.
Second, we evaluate political rights and civil liberties as determinants
of economic growth in EU and candidate countries.  Third, we study
economic freedom indices and sub-indices as economic growth
determinants. Fourth, we complement economic freedom indicators
with structural indicators to assess also implications of technological
advance and investment intensity on growth. To follow the traditions
of conditional beta convergence we include initial levels into
regressions as well. By including these initial conditions, we are able
to test beta-convergence.
3.1. Education and Life Expectancy as Very Weak Worldwide
Determinants of Economic Growth
Many studies attribute economic growth to the level of education or
human capital as measured with educational level of the labour force
or population. However, information used in these studies, time
periods covered and the sample of countries included make it difficult
to implement in the evaluation of Estonia’s prospects.
For instance, the impact of knowledge and human capital on
growth in OECD countries has been thoroughly studied by Bassanini,
Scarpetta and others (Bassanini, Scarpetta, Visco 2000; Bassanini,
Scarpetta 2001; Bassanini, Scarpetta, Hemmings 2001; Bassanini,
Scarpetta 2002). Still, we do not know to what extent the findings are
appropriate for the EU environment or whether these conclusions can
be expanded to the Baltic States or Estonia. The problem is
complicated by problems in data quality even in the OECD countries.
There may be many compatibility problems in the education data in
EU candidate countries.
There are also studies on implications role of education and
human capital on economic growth in transition economies. Some of
these studies also address income convergence with the EU levels.
However, these studies often neglect the Baltic States and sometimes
7the data include years before the radical political and structural
reforms.
For instance, Barbone and Zalduendo (1996) studied income
convergence in 5 CEE countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia, Slovenia) using Penn World Tables Mark 5.6 data for 1965-
1989. They found that quality of human capital is essential for
economic growth but it must be accompanied by appropriate policy,
regulatory and legal framework. Monetary and fiscal policies, rule of
law as well as openness to trade were also found to be key
determinants of economic growth. However, one may suspect that
radical policy reforms, harmonisation with the acquis communautaire
and expected accession to the EU may have changed and will change
the economic environment in CEE countries so that the factors which
determined pre-transition growth (within CMEA) until 1989 may not
be appropriate today and in the near future within EU framework. 
According to the New Growth Theory, human capital is broadly
expected to be very important for growth. Since many transition
economies inherited high (nominal) human capital relative to GDP per
capita from the pre-transition period, they are expected to have good
prospects for economic growth. However, Spagat (2002) found that
human capital of transition economies might also deteriorate.
Educational standards and traditions take long time to build up but
may be lost relatively quickly, transition brings new requirements,
industries, etc.
Due to the ‘poverty trap’ human capital may decline to meet low
living standards (Spagat, 2002). He points out two parallel processes –
those transition economies which are doing well and will join EU
soon, can preserve and enhance their human capital potential and it
will promote economic growth. However, for some transition
countries and perhaps even in some regions of otherwise successful
countries public spending on education or financial resources of
parents may be insufficient, enrolments’ decline and human capital
deterioration seems very real. It draws our attention to the fact that the
processes in the EU candidate countries may differ from those in less
successful transition economies.
To start with the simplest cross-country evaluation of education
as determinant of economic growth we first examine data from the
UNDP Human Development Report (HDR 2001). We use education
indices (abbreviation EDU_IND) and combined primary, secondary
and tertiary gross enrolment ratios (in %, ENROLM) as proxies for
education and life expectancy indices (LIFE_IND) and life
expectancies at birth (in years, LIFE_EXP) as proxies for the health of
8nations. We define GROWTH as index of per capita GDP at PPP in
1999 compared to 1993 level. We also include 1993 GDP per capita at
PPP as the initial level (LEVEL93) into traditional conditional
convergence equation.
The correlation matrices in Tables 1 and 2 show that education
and life expectancy indicators are better correlated with levels of GDP
per capita than GDP growth rates. Positive correlation between
education and life expectancy indicators is slightly higher in the
European Union member states and candidate countries (sample of 28
countries) than in the world-wide sample of 154 countries. Against the
beta-convergence hypothesis, there was a weak positive correlation of
growth rates of GDP per capita in 1993.
Table 1.  Correlation Matrix for 154 countries
GROWTH LEVEL93 EDU_IND ENROLM LIFE_IND LIFE_EXP
 GROWTH     1.000000
 LEVEL93     0.028174    1.000000
 EDU_IND     0.097410    0.626839     1.000000
 ENROLM     0.119698    0.668463     0.913289     1.000000
 LIFE_IND     0.054654    0.685778     0.790962     0.753296     1.000000
 LIFE_EXP     0.054656    0.685902     0.791006     0.753539     0.999891   1.000000
Table 2.  Correlation Matrix for EU15 and CC13
GROWTH LEVEL93 EDU_IND ENROLM LIFE_IND LIFE_EXP
GROWTH     1.000000
LEVEL93  0.089502  1.000000
EDU_IND  0.127943  0.517711  1.000000
ENROLM  0.064437  0.537096  0.901221  1.000000
LIFE_IND  0.125441  0.825981  0.539582  0.571923  1.000000
LIFE_EXP  0.118208  0.828122  0.538597  0.575739  0.998813  1.000000
A cross-country regression of growth rate on the initial GDP and
on education measures shows the following (sample of 154 countries,
with values of t-statistic in parenthesis):
     GROWTH   = 1.0597 - 0.0041*LEVEL93 + 0.0026*ENROLM. (1)
          (11.91)   (0.865)   (1.683)
However, this regression resulted in a low adjusted R2 value of
0.006 only. The initial level of GDP in 1993 entered into regression
with the theoretically correct sign but remained statistically
insignificant. The combined level of primary, secondary and tertiary
9enrolment is found to be significant with 90% confidence level.
Health indicators were not significant in regression. Regressing the
logarithms of growth rates on logarithms of enrolment improved the
empirical results slightly.
While it would be interesting to estimate the same model for EU
and candidate countries, it was not possible to find a satisfactory
model.
Thus, although the education and life expectancy sub-indices
together with the GDP per capita index are used in the formation of
general Human Development Index and also can predict GDP per
capita level at PPP in 1999, these indicators failed to explain
economic growth. Our failure in this estimation is not surprising based
on the work by Fuente and Donénech (2000). These authors showed
that even in OECD countries human capital stock may be measured
with errors and data deficiencies may be partially responsible for poor
empirical performance of human capital in growth equations. The
authors reached theoretically plausible results that survived robustness
check only after a thorough revision of national data. In our case it
should be also noted that the enrolment indicator might be misleading
for smaller countries as many students continue their tertiary
education abroad1. The enrolment ratio as well as length of schooling
may not describe content of the education. There may also be
mismatches in the quality and professional structures in labour
demand and supply etc.
Our very simple exercise with HDI data revealed that general
education and life expectancy indices could hardly be treated as
determinants of economic growth or convergence. Even if there is
some very weak positive correlation in world-wide data, the indicators
fail to explain growth rate differences within the enlarging EU.
3.2. Political Rights and Civil Liberties as Growth Regressors
In addition to education, which may describe the nation’s potential for
development it is important to consider political rights and civil
liberties that indicate the opportunities to use this potential. Many
studies link various freedom indicators to economic growth. Political
rights and civil liberties were included into cross-country growth and
convergence regressions for instance by Barro and Lee (1994), by
Sala-i-Martin (1997) and de Melo et al. (1997).
Studying the role of institutions in transition,2 Havrylyshyn and
van Roden (2000) suggested distinguishing two categories of
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institutions that are separately measurable and may have separate
effects on economic performance:
?   Political and civic freedom, which includes democratic process,
freedom of assembly and speech, equal treatment of political and
judicial bodies etc;
?   Legal framework for economic activity that includes legislation
for free economic activity, contract law, rule of law and
transparency, security of property rights etc.
In our paper, we use Freedom House indicators (FH 2001) of
political rights and civil liberties as the first category of institutions
that concern more general values. We also restrict our sample to the
enlarging EU that included 15 member states and 13 candidate
countries. Data about some candidate countries is available since the
beginning of 1990s only. To have our sample less biased and not too
dominated by the information available about EU member states only
we used the information since 1980.
In FH country ratings the indices between 1 and 2.5 are given to
countries that are considered to be “free”; indices between 3 and 5.5
indicate “partly free” countries, while indices between 5.5 and 7
describe countries that are “not free”. Those indices were interpreted
as proxies for institutional development – the smaller the value of
index and the more freedom a country enjoys, the more developed its
institutions should be.
The GDP annual growth indices (acronym GROW) as well as
GDP per capita levels at PPP (in thousand current US dollars,
acronym GDP followed by two digit year number) were taken from
the World Bank database and also from the World Bank NHP
(Nutrition, Health, and Population) database. For filling in some
missing observations we used also data from Eurostat, OECD, UN and
other statistical sources.
We started with a simple estimation of cross-section regression
that included GDP annual growth indices (as dependent variables),
GDP per capita at PPP in 1992 (the first year with data that covered all
selected countries)3 and indices of political rights and civil liberties as
conditioning independent variables. The data were organised as a
panel of 1980-2001 data pooled across 28 countries (15 EU member
states and 13 candidate countries). For many candidate countries (and
for re-united Germany) the time series were shorter we used an
unbalanced sample in our estimations.
The panel data estimation with common coefficients and
intercept produced the following result (t-Statistics in parenthesis):
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   GROW = 1.0575 - 0.000986*GDP92 - 0.00876*POLI(-4),  (2)
  (160.04)   (-2.896)  (-6.938)     
where GROW is annual growth index, GDP92 is the value of GDP per
capita in thousands of PPP adjusted USD and POLI(-4) is index of
political rights4 for the country four years earlier. Civil rights
indicators were less important (with all tested leads), and so were
political rights indicators with other leads. Thus, the maximum impact
of changes in political rights on economic growth occurs after 4 years
being less significant earlier and later.
However, although the coefficients for GDP per capita level and
political rights had correct signs in conditional beta convergence
context (the higher the GDP per capita and the less political rights the
country enjoys, the lower the annual GDP growth index is) and were
statistically significant, the adjusted R2 value remained 0.106. Due to
this regression, the growth rate is mainly determined by intercept
while differences in income levels and political rights make only
minor corrections to it. Since the time series were short (especially for
candidate countries), the panel regression result was driven mainly by
cross-country differences and possible non-stationarity of time series
was of minor importance.
We also estimated the regression for a shorter period (1992-
2001) to verify that equation (2) is not too dominated by longer time
series of EU member states (or states that were not yet EU members
then). This check gave almost the same results as equation (2)
although with a little lower adjusted R2 value (0.085).
While trying to estimate the same function with country-specific
coefficients for political rights indices, these coefficients turned
statistically insignificant or obtained a “wrong” sign. Only for
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland and Romania the
regression remained statistically significant while for other countries
in the sample the coefficient for political rights remained statistically
insignificant.
Considering the fact that political and civil rights indices were
equal and constant for almost all EU member states it was quite
expectable that their growth differentials have to be determined by
other factors. Thus, the member states participated in the panel
estimation mainly in the form of cross-country regression while there
were almost no political rights’ or civil liberties’ changes.
Thus, although the equation (2) gives some explanation to
growth rate differences in enlarging EU in general, one must be
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careful in drawing any conclusions regarding individual countries. As
the country-specific estimation failed for Estonia, the regression does
not confirm that Estonia’s very high political and civil rights’ indices
were reliable determinants of further economic growth and
convergence to the EU.
3.3. Impact of economic freedom on growth
Since broad indicators of institutional development did not provide a
good explanation of differences in economic growth, we turn to
indicators that are more closely linked to economic activity and can be
treated as the second category of economy-related institutions in the
afore-mentioned distinction made by Havrylyshyn and van Roden
(2000). Many aspects of economic freedom have found to be
significant determinants of economic growth (usually in broader
samples of countries). For instance, Knack and Keefer (1995), and
Voigt and Engerer (2002) discussed property rights as determinants of
economic growth. Kaufmann, Kraay and Lobatón (1999, 2002)
studied the role of governance. Murrell (1992, 1996) studied
sequencing of liberalisation and institutional development for the
transition process. Piazolo (1999) found that economic growth in 25
transition economies was positively correlated with the advancement
of institutional change (assessed by EBRD in nine different areas) and
with increase in the capital stock in transition economies. There are
also many studies of corruption, rule of law etc.
The indices of economic freedom (and their sub-indices)
published by the Heritage Foundation (2000) may serve as proxies for
institutions concerning economic freedom. At least by definition these
indices and sub-indices describe development of important
institutional issues. We assume that an index of economic freedom
represents development of responsible institutions in a country. The
index of economic freedom is published in the beginning of a year
based on the information available before July in the previous year,
thus the index for 2002 is based on developments from July 2000 to
the end of June 2001. As a result, the available indices from 1995 to
2002 actually describe how countries scored in 1994-2001. The list of
50 independent variables is divided into 10 broad factors (or sub-
indices) of economic freedom. The higher the score of a factor, the
greater the level of government interference in the economy and the
less economic freedom a country enjoys (index 1 describes the freest
economies while a score of 5 signifies a set of institutions and policies
that are least conducive to growth). The sub-indexes include:
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?  Fiscal burden of government (measured by tax rates, government
expenditures, methods of financing expenditures, etc. to capture
the true cost of government to society) – acronym FISC;
?  Trade policy (measured by such impediments to trade as tariffs
and duties, quotas, licensing requirements, corruption within
customs service etc.) – acronym TRAD;
?  Government intervention in the economy (government
consumption as a percentage of economy, government ownership
of businesses and industries, economic output produced by the
government etc) - acronym GOVE;
?  Monetary policy (the main criterion is inflation that confiscates
wealth and distorts pricing, misallocates resources and
undermines a free society) - acronym MONE;
?  Capital flows and foreign investment (restrictions on foreign
investment and inflow of foreign capital in foreign investment
code, restrictions on foreign ownership, unequal treatment of
foreign and domestic investors, restrictions on repatriation of
earnings etc.) – acronym FORE;
?  Banking and finance (evaluated through government ownership in
banks and government influence over allocation of credit,
restrictions to foreign banks, restrictions to offer financial services
like transactions with securities and insurance activities) –
acronym BANK;
?  Wages and prices (extent of government wage and price controls
that distort allocation of resources to their highest use or market
value, government subsidies to businesses) – acronym WAGE;
?  Property rights (legally granted and protected private property,
commercial code defining contracts, government expropriation of
property, government influence on judicial system, delays in
receiving judicial decisions, corruption within judiciary) –
acronym PROP;
?  Regulation (licensing requirements to run businesses, ease of
obtaining licenses, environmental and labour regulations including
paid vacations and parental leave, corruption and uniform
appliance of regulations) – acronym REGU;
?  Black market (as a reaction to government intervention and
restrictions but also as smuggling, piracy of intellectual property,
production of goods and services for black market) – acronym
BLAC.
The economic freedom in a country in general is assessed by an
overall index (acronym OVER). Four broad categories are
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distinguished on the basis of overall index: countries with score under
1.95 – free, with score between 2 to 2.95 – mostly free, with score
between 3 and 3.95 – mostly unfree and countries with score of 4 or
higher – repressed.
In order to quantify possible implications of economic freedom
on growth in EU member states and candidate countries we first
estimate regression between growth, overall index of economic
freedom and initial income level. Panel estimation of cross-country
data for the period 1994-2001 gave the result:
   GROW= 1.0918 - 0.0009802*GDP93 - 0.01823*OVER (3)
(55.33)(-2.1531)  (-3.1212)
where GDP93 was the value of GDP per capita in thousands of PPP
adjusted USD in 1993 as indicator of initial income levels and OVER
was the overall index of economic freedom. Initial income level and
overall index of economic freedom had the theoretically “correct”
correlation (higher initial income level and less free or more repressed
economy tended to reduce growth rates) and was found to be
statistically significant. Negative dependence on initial income level
implies that convergence can be expected in the long run. However,
adjusted R2 of this estimation was as low as 0.035.
Estimation of the regression with all 10 sub-indices of economic
freedom included (Appendix 1) that only three of them were
statistically significant (and had correct sign). Thus, after stepwise
exclusion of insignificant indicators we reached an equation:
GROW = 1.13598 + 0.006019*BANK - 0.016402*FISC - 0.0100816*FORE?
   (64.34)    (2.0224) (-4.2657)    (-2.5232)
 -0.00261486*MONE - 0.0075387*REGU (4)
  (-2.0416)  (-2.0295)
However, the indices on banking and finance that considered
government ownership in banks, government influence over allocation
of credit and restrictions to activities of foreign banks occurred to be
positively correlated to growth. The coefficient for BANK indices has
a clearly unacceptable ‘wrong’ sign that does not comply with theory
based expectations. The adjusted R2 value of this regression reached
0.142.
After exclusion of the BANK variable, the REGU variable that
considered licensing requirements, environmental and labour
15
regulations, was insignificant as well. Thus, the final regression
equation with economic freedom sub-indices was:
GROW = 1.1354 - 0.018709*FISC - 0.0081808*FORE –
(63.83)  (-5.185)  (-2.1639)
0.0027814*MONE     (5)
(-2.3479)
Regression (5) gives a little higher adjusted R2 value (0.127) than
equation (3), however, initial income levels failed to enter as
statistically significant determinants of growth. Thus, the combination
of sub-indices explains growth rates but does not confirm convergence
towards the steady state growth rates.
Among the economic freedom sub-indices the contribution of
fiscal burden is the highest. An improvement of fiscal sub-index by 1
unit (from 3 to 2, for instance) results in a 1.87 percentage point
higher annual growth rate. Equal improvements of sub-indices that
described regulations of foreign capital movement or monetary policy
yielded smaller growth accelerations. If a country reaches the highest
possible ratings for the afore-mentioned sub-indices (all of them equal
to 1), then based on equation (5) about 10.7 per cent annual growth
rate can be expected. The indices usually shared by many EU member
states are FISC – 4.5, FORE – 2; MONE – 1, which predict 3.2%
annual GDP growth (actual growth in EU15 was 3.4% in 2000 and
1.5% in 2001). Estonia’s corresponding indices in 2001 (3.5; 1 and 2)
predict 5.6% growth rate (instead of actual 7.1% in 2000 and 5.0% in
2001).
Nevertheless, the afore-mentioned sub-indices of economic
freedom should not be treated as strong determinants of growth as the
value of adjusted R2 was still quite low. Many sub-indices of
economic freedom which in economic context should be of great
importance (impact of black market, overregulated labour market with
wage rigidities, trade policies etc) did not enter into growth regression.
It does not mean that these institutional indicators are not important at
all. The indicators that entered into regression equations were simply
more significant. With some loss in prediction power these may be
replaced by other indicators.
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3.4.  Augmented Regression with Some Real Economy Indicators
Next we insert into the regression some indicators of the real economy
that may complement institutional or other determinants of economic
growth and give some additional, more detailed information. Thus,
besides sub-index TRAD that was related to restrictions in trade, we
insert into the regressions actual ratios of exports of goods and
services to GDP (acronym EKSP). We also included actual inflation
rate (measured as GDP deflator, acronym INFL) to detail the MONE
sub-index that also concerned inflation. Besides the FORE sub-index
that concerned regulations on foreign capital movement we insert
actual net inflow of direct investment as ratio to GDP (acronym FDI)
and actual gross capital formation as ratio to GDP (acronym CAP). In
order to consider also impact of the ‘New Economy’ and ICT
penetration we added the share of high-technology exports (as per cent
of manufactured exports, acronym HIGH), number of personal
computes per 100 inhabitants ( PC), also number of internet users per
100 persons, (INT) and number of telephone lines and mobile phone
subscribers per 100 population (acronym PHON). These data were
retrieved from the World Bank, UNO and ITU databases.
Initially we conducted a panel estimation with all of the sub-
indices of economic freedom and all of the additional structural and
ICT indicators. The panel estimation results (Appendix.2) included
many statistically insignificant variables and also some significant
variables with a ‘wrong’ sign.
The best approximation of economic growth reached after
exclusion of insignificant and ‘wrongly’ performing variables is
depicted in equation (6) and Appendix 3.
   GROW = 1.1136 - 0.0156*OVER - 0.0186*FISC+ 0.00173*CAP -
  (37.27) (-2.756) (-4.090)   (3.292)
0.00715*INFL + 0.00040*HIGH (6)
(-2.484)  (2.449)
This panel estimation gave the adjusted R2 value of 0.37 and
approximates growth rates clearly better than equation (5), which
included only economic freedom indicators.
Equation (6) reveals that the most important determinants of
annual growth indices within the sample of 28 EU member states and
candidate countries are overall economic freedom indices, fiscal
burden sub-indices, gross capital formation ratio in GDP (in per cent),
inflation (measured as GDP deflator index) and share of high
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technology exports in manufactured exports (in per cent). Initial
income level failed to be statistically significant in explaining growth
rates. Thus, the regression gives more or less satisfactory
approximation of growth rate differences but does not confirm long
run convergence (faster growth or catching-up of initially low-income
economies).
This very simple augmentation of economic freedom data with
some structural indicators showed that within the sample of European
Union member states and candidate countries institutional indicators
alone (or together with initial income levels) do not predict growth
rates of economies well enough. Institutional development indicators
seem to describe rather preconditions of economic development than
perform as determinants of exact economic growth. Inclusion of some
structural indicators together with institutional indicators into
regressions can remarkably improve the quality of economic growth
predictions.
Nevertheless, a comment is to be added here. Equation (6)
concerns the whole sample of 28 countries. For individual countries
the best selections of growth determinants may be different. For
instance, the same panel estimation with country-specific estimates of
intercepts raised the adjusted R2 value to 0.58 but made all other
variables besides CAP statistically insignificant. This means that only
the fine-tuning of intercepts for each country leads to a different set of
statistically significant independent variables. However, our purpose
here was just to identify most important determinants for the enlarging
EU and not for individual countries. If for some candidate countries
the set of most important growth determinants has been different until
now, it does not mean that this country-specific set will be as
important after accession into EU. On the other hand, the European
Union itself will also be a little different after enlargement and the
determinants that guided development of relatively well-doing
countries may lose some of their importance for some time. Therefore,
we found it essential to evaluate these possible growth determinants
for the whole sample.
Although the discussed indicators failed to be strong and
exhaustive determinants of economic growth within the EU
framework, these can still explain approximately one-third of the
economic growth variances. Evaluation of Estonia’s prospects in the
light of indicators that proved to be most important for the enlarging
EU in general confirms positive expectations of the future.
First, the Heritage Foundation ranked Estonia among the freest
countries in the world. By overall index of economic freedom Estonia
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occupied the fourth place in 2002 (with overall index score 1.8) and
the sixth place in 2003 with the same score 5. Thus, based on the
overall index, Estonia is ahead of other European Union candidate
countries and many current member states (just behind Luxembourg,
Ireland and Denmark).
Second, by fiscal burden in 2002, Estonia scored on the same
level with Ireland, Cyprus, Latvia and Lithuania (score of 3.5) and
ahead of other EU member states and candidate countries. For 2003,
Estonia’s scoring remained the same and was shared with Lithuania
and Cyprus while Ireland moved ahead to 3.0 and Latvia fell to 4.0.
Nevertheless, Estonia’s position among EU member states and
candidate countries is rather promising. It should be also mentioned
that lower fiscal burden is often shared by economies that otherwise
tend to be under-regulated, have remarkable shares of black market
and do not occupy high positions by overall index. Opportunities for
radical reduction of fiscal burden index within the EU environment
are scanty.
Third, the share of gross capital formation in Estonia’s GDP was
rather high also. The average for 1994-2001 reached 27.7%, being
higher in Slovak Republic, Czech Republic and Hungary. Capital
formation ratios in EU member states tended to be lower.
Fourth, although the inflation rate was very high initially it has
declined remarkably in recent years. Estonia scored immediately after
Lithuania, Latvia and Malta with the fourth lowest harmonised
consumer price index among candidate countries in 2000. Price
dynamics will be further kept under control also by aspiration to join
the ERM 2 mechanism right after accession and the need to comply
with the price stability requirements in Maastricht criteria.
Fifth, the average share of high-technology exports in total
manufacturing exports (14.5%) during 1996-2000 placed Estonia
ahead of many candidate countries and some EU member states.
Although in 2000 Estonia scored the fifth place in our 28-country
sample with 29.8%, it still remained quite far from 72% in Malta, 47%
in Ireland, 35% in Netherlands and 32% in the United Kingdom.
However, it is appropriate to mention that volatile volumes of
subcontracting to Nordic countries raised the share of high technology
exports to exclusively high level in 2000 and it may be difficult to
maintain this level in the circumstances of worldwide ICT sector
recession.
Nevertheless, these five most significant economic growth
determinants insist that Estonia’s prospects may be rather good. When
we fit recent available Estonian data into the equation (6), we find a
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predicted annual growth rate of in more than 7%. This shows that the
growth rates reached in recent years (7.1% in 2000, 5.0 in 2001 and
5.7% during three quarters of 2002) are close to what might have been
expected. However, one must not forget that the afore-mentioned
factors explained only one-third of the economic growth variances in
EU and candidate countries.  Growth rates depend on many other
factors as well.
4. Conclusions
There are many studies about beta convergence of cross-country
incomes. Nevertheless, empirical data do not confirm the general
convergence hypothesis and income divergences seem to prevail
instead of catching-up. There are ideas that growth theories may fail
due to the fact that the role of institutions and institutional
development is often overlooked. Numerous studies relate economic
growth to institutional development; however, these studies are based
on worldwide cross-country samples and often cover rather long time
series. One cannot deduct from these studies that institutions and
variances in their development play the same role within the smaller
sample of European Union member states and candidate countries.
The problem is aggravated by the fact that for many candidate
countries the data before 1990s belong to rather different “pre-
transition” era and as many of them will be accessed to the EU soon,
then these “pre-transition” findings can hardly guide their further
development within the EU.
In this study we tried to find out whether there are easily
accessible institutional indicators that may serve as determinants of
economic growth and convergence within the enlarging EU. If such
indicators had been available, we would have tried to assess Estonia’s
prospects considering these indicators.
We failed to prove the impact of education (measured by
combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment or education
index in the Human Development Report) on growth rates in EU
member states and candidate countries. The problem may be also too
aggregate information on education that fails to reveal structural
differences in education, or its quality and compliance of nominal
education levels with demand of labour market. Official statistics on
education can be misleading in measuring actual knowledge of
population.
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We found a very weak impact of political rights and initial
income levels on growth rates. Although these indicators can explain
only about 10% of the growth rate variances, these findings confirmed
that if no other determinants are considered, Estonia may expect
relatively high growth rates (as initial income level was low and the
highest level of political rights is shared with most of the European
economies). As initial income level is inversely related to growth, then
it supports expectations about beta convergence and catching-up.
The overall index of economic freedom along with initial income
levels proved to be rather weak determinants of growth rates also.
Sub-indices of fiscal burden, foreign capital inflow restrictions and
monetary restrictions explained growth rates a little better. However, a
combination of these sub-indices outperformed influence of initial
income level differentials and thus does not confirm convergence or
catching-up.
Our final test revealed that the growth rate differentials in the EU
and candidate countries might be much better approximated if
economic freedom indices were complemented by some real economy
indicators. For instance, regression of growth rates on overall
economic freedom and fiscal burden indices with gross capital
formation ratios, inflation and shares of high technology exports in
total manufacturing exports gave remarkably better results.
A simple exercise with available data on institutional
development revealed that although institutions provide necessary
environment for economic transactions, institutional development
indicators alone could not predict growth rate differentials well
enough. A reason for this finding may be that we discussed
institutions in a too aggregate way. Although there are quite large
growth rate differences between the EU member states, they often
share similar level of institutional development. It may be also that the
contribution of institutional development is more important worldwide
and ceased to have great impact on growth after passing a certain
threshold level or after becoming similar in the result of harmonisation
process. Developed institutional framework may also support stability
of growth and reduce risks or implications of adverse shocks.
Nevertheless, it seems that institutional development provides
preconditions for economic growth but the actual growth rates depend
on many other factors as well. It confirms once again the conclusion
reached by Havrylyshyn and van Roden (2000) that institutions matter
(in transition) but so do policies.
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Notes
1. Therefore the enrolment ratio for Luxembourg was as low as 72%, for
instance. Simultaneously, the enrolment ratios for countries that teach
many foreign students may be a little higher. However, within the
economic growth context well-known universities with lots of foreign
students are also centres of intellectual potential that promote
development.
2. Their sample included CEEC countries and descendants of the former
Soviet Union.
3. Thus, since earlier data were not avail able we used the level in the
middle of the period instead of the traditional initial income level.
4. The smaller the value of political rights indicator is, the more political
rights the country enjoys, thus decline of index from 7 (“not free”)
towards 1 (“free”) contributes to the growth rate.
5. Here we used years as published by the Heritage Foundation. As it was
mentioned before, evaluations are based on the data of previous year,
thus the index for 2003 actually describes the situation  from July 2001
to June 2002.
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Appendix 1.  Estimation with All Sub-Indices of Economic
Freedom
Dependent Variable: GROW?
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Date: 12/05/02   Time: 16:42
Sample: 1994 2001
Included observations: 8
Total panel observations 215
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C  1.147808  0.023302  49.25847  0.0000
GDP93? -0.001072  0.000708 -1.514441  0.1315
BANK?  0.005754  0.003136  1.834932  0.0680
BLAC? -0.004005  0.002985 -1.341438  0.1813
FISC? -0.013970  0.004476 -3.120897  0.0021
FORE? -0.010985  0.004468 -2.458667  0.0148
GOVE?  0.000552  0.002899  0.190400  0.8492
MONE? -0.003784  0.002149 -1.760614  0.0798
PROP? -0.001923  0.004153 -0.463023  0.6438
REGU? -0.009823  0.004062 -2.418172  0.0165
TRAD?  0.003777  0.002892  1.305873  0.1931
WAGE?  0.002979  0.003991  0.746340  0.4563
R-squared  0.182918     Mean dependent var  1.032595
Adjusted R-squared  0.138643     S.D. dependent var  0.029126
S.E. of regression  0.027032     Sum squared resid  0.148337
F-statistic  4.131379     Durbin-Watson stat  1.463043
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000017
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Appendix 2.  Estimation Result with Selected Indicators of
Economic Freedom and Additional Structural
Indicators
Dependent Variable: GROW?
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Date: 12/08/02   Time: 11:05
Sample(adjusted): 1996 2000
Included observations: 5 after adjusting endpoints
Total panel observations 127
Cross sections without valid observations dropped
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C  1.115950  0.041396  26.95765  0.0000
FISC? -0.023926  0.007807 -3.064448  0.0028
FORE? -0.002521  0.006743 -0.373874  0.7092
GOVE? -0.006631  0.004305 -1.540171  0.1265
MONE?  0.001851  0.003496  0.529605  0.5975
BANK?  0.010241  0.004025  2.544056  0.0124
BLAC? -0.006102  0.003830 -1.593395  0.1140
PROP? -0.004438  0.005679 -0.781469  0.4363
REGU? -0.004225  0.005735 -0.736705  0.4629
TRAD?  0.001124  0.004103  0.274079  0.7846
WAGE? -0.000123  0.004974 -0.024652  0.9804
EKSP?  7.37E-06  0.000161  0.045665  0.9637
CAP?  0.001880  0.000654  2.876700  0.0049
FDI?  0.000199  0.000708  0.280812  0.7794
HIGH?  0.000139  0.000257  0.543341  0.5880
INFL? -0.006727  0.003124 -2.153752  0.0335
INT? -0.000730  0.000727 -1.004388  0.3175
PC_?  0.001436  0.000672  2.136579  0.0349
PHON?  1.78E-05  0.000236  0.075609  0.9399
GDP93? -0.001063  0.001623 -0.654916  0.5139
R-squared  0.488892     Mean dependent var 1.032233
Adjusted R-squared  0.398135     S.D. dependent var 0.031221
S.E. of regression  0.024221     Sum squared resid 0.062772
F-statistic  5.386795     Durbin-Watson stat 1.852167
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
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Appendix 3.  Final Estimation with Economic Freedom and
Structural Indicators
Dependent Variable: GROW?
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Date: 12/08/02   Time: 15:28
Sample(adjusted): 1996 2000
Included observations: 5 after adjusting endpoints
Total panel observations 131
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C  1.113579  0.029875  37.27503  0.0000
OVER? -0.015608  0.005664 -2.755863  0.0067
FISC? -0.018578  0.004542 -4.090284  0.0001
CAP?  0.001728  0.000525  3.292011  0.0013
INFL? -0.007148  0.002878 -2.483783  0.0143
HIGH?  0.000400  0.000163  2.448647  0.0157
R-squared  0.396029     Mean dependent var  1.033141
Adjusted R-squared  0.371870     S.D. dependent var  0.031282
S.E. of regression  0.024792     Sum squared resid  0.076832
F-statistic  16.39272     Durbin-Watson stat  1.505155
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
